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WHEN THE STARS ALIGN: NARROWING THE SCOPE OF
APPELLATE REVERSALS OF JUDICIALLY APPROVED CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Joshua Levy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions, especially those filed in or removed to federal
court, are ever more prominent in the landscape of modern
1
American litigation. Since Congress passed the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAFA), which vastly expanded diversity jurisdiction in
2
the context of class actions, district courts have seen a veritable
3
explosion of class action diversity filings and removals. In the Third
Circuit alone, district courts have experienced an almost fourfold
4
increase in such actions in the wake of CAFA’s passage.
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn and fellow members of the Seton Hall Law Review
for their time, advice, and editorial assistance.
1
See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1723, 1754 (2008) (“[F]ederal courts have seen an increase in diversity
removals and, especially, original proceedings in the post-CAFA period as a result of
the expansion of the federal courts’ diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”).
2
Federal district courts now possess, inter alia, original jurisdiction over classes
whose members number 100 or more and whose claims, in the aggregate, exceed $5
million. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B) (2006).
3
Overall, the average number of post-CAFA federal class actions filed and
removed per month more than doubled. See Lee & Willging, supra note 1, at 1723;
see also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT
TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS 1 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup
/cafa1107.pdf/$file/cafa1107.pdf. Additionally, according to the Federal Judicial
Center, “reliable data on class action activity in most state court systems simply do not
exist.” Id. at 4. Nevertheless, CAFA aside, there appears to be an upward trend in
state class action filings as well. Id. at 4–5.
4
Lee & Willging, supra note 1, at 1760. This relatively large increase in the
Third Circuit has generally been attributed to non-CAFA factors, such as a more
plaintiff-friendly attitude toward class certification. Id. at 1761. See generally EMERY G.
LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 22 (2008), available at
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/cafa0408.pdf.
One recent study of
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With the growing salience of class actions to the federal docket,
the necessity of their efficient and timely adjudication cannot be
5
overstated. The federal judiciary is notoriously overburdened, and
any opportunity to alleviate that burden should be seized upon.
Conversely, any attempt to needlessly exacerbate that burden should
be avoided.
Notwithstanding dismissals and state court remands, federal
diversity class actions are most commonly concluded through
6
settlements. In fact, one recent quantitative study of over 250 class
actions noted that in every case where a putative class was certified, a
7
settlement was eventually negotiated and approved. Therefore, to

securities class actions emphasizes the point that, immediately post-CAFA, federal
filings dramatically increased. Dr. Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in
Securities Class Action Litigation: 2013 Full-Year in Review, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING
2 (Jan. 21, 2014), available at http://www.nera.com
/nera-files/PUB_2013_Year_End_Trends_1.2014.pdf. In 2006, the year immediately
following CAFA’s passage, there were 132 federal securities class actions filed. Id. By
2008, that number had swelled to 245. Id. In the years since, though, the post-CAFA
boom appears to have leveled out; but case filings have remained above 200 every
year since 2008. Id.
5
See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts and
Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473 (2009).
According to Circuit Judge O’Scannlain, the caseload facing federal district judges is
“crushing,” and “the actual burden [on appellate courts] is even greater than the raw
numbers suggest.” Id. at 475; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Case Glut
Impedes Civil Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052970204505304577001771159867642.html (“‘Civil litigation has
ground to a halt,’ [District] Judge McCuskey said, adding that ‘you’ve got a right to
sue but you do not get a right to a speedy jury trial.’”). Indeed, some congressional
debate surrounding the passage of CAFA dealt with the practical effect it would have
on the federal courts. Lee & Willging, supra note 1, at 1732–33. For a recent
examination of the effect the federal budget sequester is having on the courts, see
Dahlia Lithwick, Even Before the Shutdown, Federal Courts Had Already Been Crippled By
(Oct.
14,
2013),
available
at
the
Sequester,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/
federal_courts_and_shutdown_the_sequester_had_already_crippled_american.html
(“One of the great underreported outrages of the past year is the degree to which
the judicial branch has been limping along on inadequate funds. Following
sequestration last March, $350 million was stripped from the courts’ budget. The net
result has been a disaster in the administration of justice in this country.”).
6
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM
PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 6 (2008) (sampling over
250 cases). Indeed, settlement is an overwhelmingly prevalent disposition in civil
litigation in general. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the
Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 111 (2009).
7
Lee & Willging, supra note 6, at 11. This was so regardless of whether
certification came in conjunction with, or separately from, settlement approval. Id.
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mitigate the growing pressure on the federal judiciary, courts should
eschew the formation of unnecessary impediments to either the
initial approval or the finalization of class action settlements.
This Comment, specifically, argues against one such
8
impediment: the notion that structurally inadequate class action
settlements must be reversed even where curing this inadequacy will
not increase the settling class’s ultimate financial recovery. The
Comment focuses a series of cases (Dewey I, Dewey II, and Dewey III) in
which the United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit forced
such a reversal, notwithstanding the fact that the reworked settlement
provided no additional monetary advantage to any class members.
Part II of this Comment provides some preliminary factual
background to these cases. Part III delineates some of the general
requirements and procedures for—along with fundamental policies
behind—settling class actions. Next, Part IV further explores the
specific settlement at issue in the Dewey cases. And Part V explores
the underlying source of the counterintuitive doctrine espoused by
the Third Circuit in Dewey II, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem
9
Products, Inc. v. Windsor.
Finally, Part VI asserts that courts should not reverse class action
settlements for mere structural inadequacy, especially of the kind as
was at issue in the Dewey cases. Instead, when faced with such errors
at the district court level, appellate courts should apply the harmless
error doctrine. That is, if changing the language of the settlement to
comply with the law will not alter the class members’ financial
recovery, then the courts of appeals should let the settlement stand.
II. BACKGROUND
In July of 2002, the sky unleashed a heavy rainstorm on John M.
10
Dewey’s new Volkswagen Passat. The sunroof of the car, which was
supposed to drain water out of the vehicle, instead rerouted the

8

“Structurally inadequate” and “procedurally inadequate” are used in this
Comment as interchangeable labels for settlements that, while in technical violation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions, nevertheless
monetarily protected the interests of all class members as if those Rules had been
met. See infra Part III.
9
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
10
Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 17–18, Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 728 F.
Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dewey v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 07CV02249), 2007 WL 2260530
[hereinafter First Complaint].
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downpour into the car, flooding the rear passenger-side floorboards.
From there, water leaked into parts of the automatic transmission
and, in conjunction with other damage, caused the car to break
12
down.
In February of 2006, Francis Nowicki purchased a pre-owned
13
2002 Audi A6 Quattro. In March of 2008, Mr. Nowicki opened the
door to his car and noticed that half a foot of water had frozen on the
14
passenger-side floor. Mr. Nowicki removed as much of the ice and
15
water as he could and began driving.
But as he drove, the car
16
started to shake violently. Pulling into a rest stop to address the
17
issue, he eventually called a tow truck.
The experiences of Messrs. Dewey and Nowicki were by no
means unique. In response, they and a group of similarly aggrieved
18
car owners filed a class action, alleging that certain Volkswagen and
19
20
Audi models were defectively designed. The parties engaged in
21
years of extensive class-certification and merits discovery.
11

Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 17–18.
13
Fourth Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 31, Dewey v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dewey v.
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 07CV02249), 2008
WL 8039626 [hereinafter Fourth Complaint].
14
Id. at ¶ 33.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
First Complaint.
19
The broader corporate entity that oversees both car brands is known as the
Volkswagen Group (“Group”). The Group, as it calls itself, directly controls the
manufacturing of the Volkswagen and Audi lines, as well as Bentley, Bugatti, and
Lamborghini, among others. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Facts and Figures
Navigator 2012, 2 (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/
info_center/en/publications/2012/03/navigator-2012—-facts-andfigures.bin.html/binarystorageitem/
file/Navigator_21_09_2012_en_WEB.pdf.
20
First Complaint, at ¶ 18.
21
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (D.N.J. 2010)
(Dewey I) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681
F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (Dewey II). By way of general introduction, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure anticipate class certification—meaning, judicial approval of the
very structure of the lawsuit as representative—as a step primary to conclusions on
the merits (or by settlement). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Thus, some courts go so
far as to stay merits discovery until after class certification. 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:10 (9th ed. 2012). Although this type of
discovery bifurcation can help limit needless litigation in the event class certification
is denied, many courts ignore this potential benefit because of the risk of needless
12
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Eventually, in early 2010, the plaintiff class and the defendants moved
22
jointly for preliminary approval of a settlement.
The parties sent notice of the impending settlement to over 5
23
million class members.
As a result, 203 class members filed
24
The district court exhaustively
objections to the settlement.
scrutinized every component of the settlement, and analyzed each
25
objection. Subsequently, on July 30, 2010, in Dewey v. Volkswagen of
26
America (“Dewey I”), the court approved the settlement.
On May 31, 2012, in Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (“Dewey
II”), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
27
court’s approval of the settlement. According to the Third Circuit,
the structure of the settlement was such that the class representatives
28
The court
did not adequately represent the class as a whole.
therefore reversed the settlement approval and remanded to the
district court to restructure the settlement so as to fairly account for
disputes over the precise line between facts related to merits and facts related to
certification. Id. Here, discovery on both certification and merits proceeded until
settlement negotiations began. Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
22
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 560. As will be discussed further, unlike traditional
lawsuits—which may be settled without judicial sanction—parties to a class action
may only settle with court approval. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). The specific nature of the
settlement will be described infra, in Part IV. For now, this settlement provided a
number of types of relief; but, most relevant for this Comment, was the creation of
an $8 million fund from which class members could seek compensation for damaged
cars. Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189.
23
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
24
Id. The larger purposes behind class action settlement approvals, and the role
of objectors in those approvals, will be examined in more detail below. Preliminarily,
though, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit any class member to object to
proposed settlements. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). The approving district court uses
these objections to measure the fairness of the settlement. See 2 JOSEPH M.
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:10 (9th ed. 2012); see also In re Gen.
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d Cir.
1995) (“In an effort to measure the class’s own reaction to the settlement’s terms
directly, courts look to the number and vociferousness of the objectors.”).
25
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 563–615.
26
Id. at 616. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1), supra note 21, as to the requirements
of class certification being prerequisites to any conclusion to litigation, either by way
of a judgment or settlement. Common practice, therefore, is for classes to be
deemed preliminarily certified where settling defendants and plaintiffs support
certification. See generally 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS §
6:7 (9th ed. 2012). Then, when the final fairness hearing is held on the acceptability
of the settlement—after notice of the settlement has been given to class members
and objectors have had opportunity to file objections—a proper analysis of class
certification is simultaneously undertaken. Id.
27
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 190.
28
Id.
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29

the interests of the entire class.
Finally, on December 14, 2012, in yet another case captioned
Dewey v. Volkswagen of America (“Dewey III”), the district court approved
a new settlement agreement, restructured according to the guidelines
30
set forth by the Third Circuit.
Though relatively rare, appellate reversals of class action
31
settlement approvals do not themselves raise novel issues. Instead,
what makes this series of cases unique is the fact that, though
structurally inadequate, the original approved settlement would still
have functionally awarded the non-representative class members the
32
funds to which they were entitled.
Put a different way, the Third Circuit reversed because the
original settlement did not incorporate certain requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that safeguard the rights of the
absent class members who do not directly participate in the
33
negotiation of the settlement.
But even with this procedural
inadequacy, the original settlement afforded the absent class
members the same financial recovery they would have received—and,
34
in fact, did receive—under the revised settlement.
Whether
structurally appropriate or not, both the adequately and inadequately
represented class members benefited under the original settlement—
and benefited in such a way as to make their respective monetary
35
recoveries equal in fact.
In a footnote, the Third Circuit acknowledged this curiosity and
offhandedly dismissed it, instead suggesting that the ultimate lack of
29
30

Id.
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 374 (D.N.J.

2012).
31

For example, in Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir.
2002), the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district judge abused his discretion in
approving a settlement between consumers and a tax preparation company and a
bank. There, the inadequacy involved the district judge’s insufficient scrutiny of the
interactions between class representatives’ attorneys and the defendants, opening the
door to the possibility of a collusive effect between these parties at the expense of the
class as a whole. Id. at 282–83. Or, for another example, in Staton v. Boeing Co., 327
F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit reversed approval of a class action
settlement based, first, on an incorrect methodology for calculating attorneys’ fees,
and, second, on a wildly disparate—and unjustified—differential between monetary
recovery for named class members and unnamed class members.
32
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.
33
Id. at 189.
34
Id. See also Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385
(D.N.J. 2012); infra note 139.
35
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189.
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a monetary disparity between the old and new settlements was
36
essentially irrelevant. The structural inadequacy was sufficient to
37
warrant reversal.
The notion that class action settlements with only structural
inadequacies should be reversed, however, risks imposing
unnecessary litigation costs, especially in the context of massive class
action lawsuits. The gargantuan effort required by parties to obtain
38
settlements in these cases should not be so easily undermined.
Certainly, district court decisions must be reviewable; occasionally,
39
they warrant reversal.
Indeed, the Federal Rules’ structural
requirements protect all class members and should not be ignored in
the first instance. But courts of appeals must also engage in cautious
analysis before reversing a sensitively negotiated and judicially
40
sanctioned settlement.
III. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS AND THE ADEQUACY REQUIREMENT
As a framework for complex litigation, the class action has been
described as “probably the most powerful joinder device in the
41
United States.”
Because of this power—rooted in the unique
phenomenon of being able to bind “absent class members”—the
modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure built various procedural
42
protections into the class action.
36

Id. at 189 n.19.
Id.
38
See infra text accompanying notes 97–100.
39
See supra note 31.
40
Indeed, some courts of appeals delineate a standard of review for class action
settlements that appears to go beyond standard abuse of discretion analysis. See, e.g.,
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court’s final
determination to approve the settlement should be reversed only upon a strong
showing that the district court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.”) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173
(4th Cir. 1975) (“So long as the record before [the trial court] is adequate to reach
an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should
the claim be litigated and form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense and
likely duration of such litigation, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair
assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise, [the settlement should not
be overturned].”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Admittedly, the Third Circuit
does not appear to adopt this framework. See, e.g., Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 182; In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d
Cir. 1995).
41
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 193 (2006).
42
These protections are found throughout Rule 23, the rule governing class
actions. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
37
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At the heart of the class action is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
43
23(a), which delineates the four basic requirements of this type of
44
group litigation. Each of these is fundamental, but Rule 23(a)(4),
“[t]he adequacy of the class’s representation[,] is the sine qua non of
45
modern class-action practice.” Stated differently:
The class action is an awkward device, requiring careful
judicial supervision, because the fate of the class members is
to a considerable extent in the hands of a single plaintiff
(or handful of plaintiffs, when . . . there is more than one
class representative) whom the other members of the class
may not know and who may not be able or willing to be an
46
adequate fiduciary of their interests.
By definition, a class action precludes all plaintiffs from being active
litigants and advocates for their interests. Absent class members must
rely on the class representatives—those members of the class that are
active participants in the suit—to protect their interests as well. By
way of illustration, one fear regarding the adequacy of representation
47
concerns so called “red-carpeting.” Judges carefully scrutinize fee
43

As a historical note, it is worth stating here that the modern class action has its
roots in certain equitable principles born of English common law. And the notion
that in some limited circumstances, parties to a case could bind other parties found
expression in American law as well, with early landmark cases such as Smith v.
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853), and Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356, 367 (1921). These, in turn, gave way to a more sophisticated formulation
for class actions in the 1938 Federal Rules and, subsequently, a revision in 1966 that
brought Rule 23 into existence. See SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 41, at 194–95.
44
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable [“numerosity”]; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class [“commonality”]; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [“typicality”];
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class [“adequacy”].”).
45
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE 646
(2d ed. 2008).
46
Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002).
47
32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1947 (2013) (citing Sutter v. Horizon Blue
Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 966 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)). See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is
also a conflict inherent in cases like this one, where fees are paid by a quondam
adversary from its own funds—the danger being that the lawyers might urge a class
settlement at a low figure or on less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet
treatment on fees.”); Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1139 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“Because of the potential for a collusive settlement, a sellout of a highly meritorious
claim, or a settlement that ignores the interests of minority class members, the
district judge has a heavy duty to ensure that any settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and
adequate’ and that the fee awarded plaintiffs’ counsel is entirely appropriate.”).
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awards for counsel of the class representatives. Courts worry about
these attorneys under-advocating for the class when negotiating with
defendants’ counsel, securing a higher fee award in exchange for
49
lower class compensation. Thus, it is essential that class counsel—as
well as class representatives—be able to adequately represent the class
as a whole. Considering the potential risks to absent class members,
it is no wonder that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with
50
the court’s approval.”
IV. DEWEY V. VOLKSWAGEN: THE SAGA OF A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
As mentioned in Part II, plaintiffs filed a class action against
Volkswagen for alleged water-related defects in certain Volkswagen
51
and Audi models. Like so many others, this suit never went to trial.
Instead, in early 2010, the parties petitioned the court for approval of
a settlement agreement.
A. Dewey I: Approval of the First Settlement Agreement
On July 30, 2010, the district court approved the terms of the
52
aforementioned settlement. Essentially, the settlement provided the
53
plaintiff class members with three types of relief. First, there was an
54
educational component; all class members were to be sent
preventative maintenance information on how to properly inspect
55
and clean the defective sunroofs. Second, the settlement designated
certain car models for free servicing from any authorized Volkswagen
56
dealer. And third, an $8 million fund was created to reimburse class
57
members for certain repairs.
48

See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1947.
Id. (citing Sutter, 966 A.2d at 508). A similar fear exists concerning
underhanded agreements between class counsel and class representatives, whereby the
attorneys and the class representatives secure substantial payouts for themselves,
sidelining absent class members. See id.
50
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Note also that such approval is only permitted “after a
hearing and on finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is
fair, reasonable, and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). This is generally referred
to as the “final fairness hearing.”
51
See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
52
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
53
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 175–176.
54
Id. at 175.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
49
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This $8 million fund was the subject of the successful objection
58
and the Third Circuit’s reversal. All told, there were approximately
five million class members, collective owners of over three million
59
cars.
Though all class members were seeking rectification for
appreciably similar defects, these three million cars consisted of a
60
number of vehicle models and years. Depending on the vehicle
owned, the settlement divided the class members into two groups: the
61
“reimbursement group,” and the “residual group.”
The
reimbursement group was afforded the ability to presently receive
62
reimbursement from the $8 million fund for certain damages. Any
money remaining in the fund after class members in the
reimbursement group made their claims would be made available to
63
those in the residual group.
According to the district court, this division was “based on
objective criteria, namely the past frequency of failure and the design
64
of the vehicles.” In other words, cars in the reimbursement group
more frequently experienced problems than those in the residual
65
group.
58

Id. at 189.
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
60
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 174.
61
Id. at 174–175.
62
Id. at 173.
63
Id. Administratively, the fund was capped at $8 million. Id. The settlement
provided that if this were insufficient to satisfy claims in the reimbursement group,
the class members in that group would only receive pro rata recovery, theoretically
leaving class members in the residual group with nothing. Id. at 176. Similarly, if the
$8 million were to be sufficient to satisfy all claims in the reimbursement group, but
not all claims in the residual group, reimbursement group class members would
receive full recovery and residual group class members would then receive pro rata
recovery. Id. And, as will be noted below, if the $8 million fund were to be sufficient
to cover all claims by all class members, leaving some unclaimed amount, the
settlement also provided for the “donation of all unclaimed reimbursement funds to
an educational, charitable, or research facility after five years.” Dewey I, 728 F. Supp.
2d at 561.
64
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
65
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 187. It is worth noting that the objectors, inter alia, also
objected to the factual contention that cars in the residual group necessarily saw
reduced claims:
There appears to be some dispute over whether or not the assignment
of individual plaintiffs was actually based, as representative plaintiffs
allege, on the relevant claims rates. The . . . Objectors note several
outlier car models in the residual group with higher claims rates than
certain models in the reimbursement group. We need not address this
issue because we conclude that even if representative plaintiffs did
assign cars into the various groups based on claims rates, they still
59
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B. Dewey II: Reversal of the Settlement Approval
On May 31, 2012, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s
66
approval of the settlement. The circuit found that dividing class
members into reimbursement and residual groups was a generally
acceptable framework for the administration of the settlement
67
funds. Nevertheless, in this case, the appellate court concluded that
the division demonstrated a fatal flaw in the adequacy of the class’s
68
representation.
The difference between potential claims rates for owners of cars
in the reimbursement group and those in the residual group was not
69
as clear-cut as the lower court opinion suggested. The sorting of car
models into one group or another was, to borrow the Third Circuit’s
70
phrasing, a “line-drawing exercise.” The difference in claims rates
was not an either/or proposition; rather, the different cars rested
71
along a spectrum. But—because whichever class members wound
up in the reimbursement group would be more advantageously
poised to recover from the fund—“[e]very plaintiff in the class had
an incentive to maximize the number of plaintiffs in the residual
group, while ensuring that they themselves were in the
72
reimbursement group.” Thus, class representatives had an incentive
to draw the line just below whichever car models they happened to
own, thereby sidelining absent class members and arbitrarily
73
relegating them to the residual group.
Again, the problem was not that there was a line to draw.
Instead, the settlement presented deficiencies in representation

could not adequately represent the class.
Id. at 187 n.17. Both the Third Circuit’s sidelining of the issue, and this insistence
that even proper divisions would not have sufficed, further compound the primacy of
structure over substance in the Third Circuit’s analysis.
66
Id. at 170.
67
Id. at 188. Indeed, the Third Circuit notes Volkswagen’s reliance on In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009). There, the general
acceptability of such recovery schemes was explicitly sanctioned: “This is simply a
reflection of the extent of the injury that certain class members incurred and does
not clearly suggest that the class members had antagonistic interests. . . . [It] merely
created a structure for ensuring that reimbursement is tied to the extent of
damages.” In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 272.
68
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 188.
69
Id. at 187; see also supra note 65.
70
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 187.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 187–88.
73
Id. at 188.
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74

because of “who drew the line.” As it happened, there was not a
75
single class representative in the residual group. A number of class
members from the residual group then objected and the district
court did, in fact, briefly address the objectors’ contentions:
[T]he division of class members into subclasses receiving
different benefits based upon the type of vehicle they own
does not necessarily render the settlement unfair or
unreasonable, nor does it show a conflict of interest that
renders the class representatives unable to adequately
76
represent the class.
Notwithstanding this and the other many objections, the court
77
approved the settlement.
The Third Circuit, however, pointed out that “the interests of
the representative plaintiffs and the interests of the residual group
78
aligned in opposing directions.”
According to the circuit, this
79
violated the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy requirement. Therefore, the
80
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s approval of the settlement.
The appellate court remanded the case to the district court,
recommending that the revised settlement eliminate the
81
reimbursement and residual groups entirely.
Thus, all plaintiffs
could then seek recovery from the $8 million fund without some class

74

Id. at 188–89.
Id. at 187.
76
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 579–80 (D.N.J. 2010).
77
Id. at 616.
78
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 188.
79
Id. at 190.
80
Id. Procedurally, it was not the approval of the settlement that was reversed.
See id. at 189. The district court had followed common practice, simultaneously
certifying the class and approving the settlement. See supra note 26. The Third
Circuit technically reversed for a violation of Rule 23(a) (the portion of the rule that
goes to class certification) and not Rule 23(e) (the portion of the rule that directly
deals with settlement certification); and the reversal was thus on the holding of Dewey
I that specifically dealt with class certification. Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 (“We will
reverse the District Court’s order certifying the class because the representative
plaintiffs fail to satisfy the adequacy requirement in Rule 23(a)(4).”). Still, in this
case, as in others similar in nature, class certification and settlement approval are
inexorably linked and, indeed, often conflated in both the district court and circuit
court opinions. Therefore, for clarity’s sake, the Comment will refer to the reversal
of the settlement approval, and not of class certification. Finally, it is also worth
noting that adequacy is found directly within Rule 23(e), though, as is common, the
Third Circuit emphasizes the reversal as going to Rule 23(a). See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(e)(2).
81
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189–90.
75
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82

members having priority over others.

C. Footnote 19: The Troubling Doctrinal Proposition Underlying Dewey
II
As straightforward as this reversal may appear on its face, the
analysis went beyond a simple application of Rule 23(a)(4). Under
the terms of the original settlement, the three million cars were not
83
evenly divided into the reimbursement and residual groups.
Instead, the reimbursement group was approximately double that of
84
Assuming a 100% claims rate, the
the residual group.
reimbursement group of approximately two million cars would seek
85
$16 million from the fund.
Clearly, this would exhaust an
insufficient $8 million fund, leaving nothing for the residual
claimants and even limiting recovery for those in the reimbursement
86
group.
At first blush, this report underscores the inherent
unfairness of the settlement and the inadequacy of representation for
the absent class members belonging to the residual.
As early as in Dewey I, however, the district court recognized that
it was an “unfounded assumption that 100% of the class would seek
87
out the benefits.” Indeed, though class members were notified of
the settlement while the appeal was pending, by the time the Third
Circuit promulgated its opinion in Dewey II, claims rates were so low
that “[r]epresentative plaintiffs project[ed] that the $8 million
reimbursement fund will be sufficient to satisfy the claims of those in the
reimbursement group and the residual group, if projected claim rates hold
88
true.”
82

Id. Technically, the Third Circuit made two different recommendations to the
district court for it to consider on remand. Id. First, as already noted, the parties
could eliminate the reimbursement and residual groups. Id. As will be made clear,
the restructured settlement approved by the district court in Dewey v. Volkswagen of
Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–377 (D.N.J. 2012) essentially used this formulation.
The Third Circuit did, however, offer an alternative arrangement where, instead of
certifying one class with two subgroups, the district court could create two subclasses
with two sets of representative plaintiffs. Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189–90.
83
Report of Dr. George C. Eads, Senior Consultant, CRA Charles River
Associates, Inc. at 4, Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010)
(No. 07-cv-2249), 2010 WL 3289031. Dr. Eads explained that, of the total number of
approximately three million cars, 1,084,838 were in the residual group. Id. at ¶ III.a.
84
Id. at ¶ III.a.
85
Id.
86
Id. The reimbursement group would be forced to accept only pro rata
recovery, as mentioned supra note 63.
87
Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 615 (D.N.J. 2010).
88
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 (emphasis added).
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The Third Circuit accepted this valuation; in recommending to
the district court that the new settlement simply eliminate the group
89
distinctions, the circuit noted, “there appears to be no need to
90
create the residual group.”
On this point, the circuit added a
footnote [“Footnote 19”], around which this Comment is ultimately
constructed:
Volkswagen appears to suggest that the fact that the residual
is likely sufficient to satisfy the claims arising out of the
residual group implies that the representative plaintiffs
adequately represented the class. Such an argument was
made in Amchem, and was explicitly rejected by the Supreme
91
The adequacy requirement provides structural
Court.
protections during the process of bargaining for settlement.
The fact that the stars aligned and the class members’
interests were not actually damaged does not permit
92
representative plaintiffs to bypass structural requirements.
D. Dewey III: The Restructured Settlement
On December 14, 2012, the district court approved the
93
This modified agreement followed the
restructured settlement.
recommendations of the Third Circuit, doing away with the
94
reimbursement/residual distinction.
Echoing the implications of
Footnote 19 in Dewey II, the district court in Dewey III noted that, of
the $8 million in the fund, only $5 million was actually claimed by
95
class members in the former reimbursement group. Moreover, the
value of claims from the former residual group was projected to be
96
only “between $466,048.80 and $782,296.20.” Said differently, the
stars aligned. The residual class members were not actually harmed
in the first settlement agreement.
Furthermore, in addition to not offering class members
increased recovery, the process of restricting the settlement imposed
significant costs on both the parties and the court. Months were

89

See supra note 83.
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189.
91
A direct quote from Amchem, omitted here for lack of context but crucial to
the analysis below, can be found infra text accompanying note 125.
92
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.
93
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.J. 2012).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 393 n.21.
96
Id.
90
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spent reworking the terms of the settlement.
The district court
returned to motion practice on this case, and held several lengthy
98
hearings, both in-person and over the phone. Similar to the months
of litigation before Dewey I, the court opened up the redrafted
settlement to a whole new round of objections, several which had to
99
be addressed at length in Dewey III. Attorneys’ fee awards increased
100
by over $100,000.
Clearly, the costs of reversal were significant. To no one’s
surprise (including the Third Circuit), the revised settlement resulted
in the same recovery for the former residual class members.
Regardless, however, the Third Circuit saw it necessary to reverse.
The glaring question, then, is why?
V. AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. V. WINDSOR: PRELUDE TO DEWEY II
A. Explaining Amchem
“No settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this
101
one,” wrote the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.
Before the Court in Amchem was a massive settlement between
plaintiffs and a consortium of twenty asbestos products
102
manufacturers.
Asbestos has a long and complicated relationship
97

More significant, perhaps, than the months between Dewey II and Dewey III are
the years between Dewey I and Dewey III. This protracted appeals process is certainly
palatable where the outcome is tangibly beneficial. But in the context of the
outcome of Dewey III, the cost is simply too high.
98
See, e.g., id. at 377, 378 n.5, 379 n.9, 380.
99
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 388 (D.N.J.
2012).
100
Id. at 390. Furthermore, considering traditional methodologies for the
calculations of such awards, this increase was modest. Id. at 390–95. Here, possibly
due to this case’s already protracted nature, the inarguably successful objectors’
attorneys sought fractions of the fees (and expenses) they claimed to have incurred.
Id.
101
521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997). It is worth noting that Amchem, in general, was a
landmark case for class action settlement certification. See, e.g., SUBRIN & WOO, supra
note 41, at 207. Prior to the Court’s decision in Amchem, various lower courts had
relaxed the requirements of Rule 23(a) in the context of certification for the
purposes of settlement. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996);
White v. Nat’l Football League, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994); Malchman v. Davis, 761
F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985). The promulgation of Amchem, however, renewed the
strength of Rule 23(a) in the context of Rule 23(e) settlement approvals. Amchem,
521 U.S. at 621 (“[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification,
eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the
impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed.”).
102
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599–600.
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103

to Western society’s advancement.
The severity of the dark
aftermath of global exposure to asbestos was perhaps matched only
by the glowing reputation it boasted before being sullied: “Seemingly
blessed with useful attributes, such as softness, flexibility and
resistance to fire, asbestos was once seen as the silk of a magical
104
105
The use of asbestos, consisting of a number of
mineral world.”
minerals used for hundreds of years in manufacturing and
construction, skyrocketed toward the end of the nineteenth and
106
beginning of the twentieth centuries.
The scientific community
began publicizing the potential health hazards associated with
107
asbestos as early as the 1930s. But cancer and other asbestos-related
108
diseases only manifest in earnest after decades of exposure. Thus,
the then-ubiquitous material’s effects resulted in a flood of lawsuits by
109
the 1970s.
In 1990, a report issued by the United States Judicial Conference
Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation determined that this flood
of cases could only efficiently be managed through legislative reform
110
at the federal level.
While Congress did not undertake any such
action, the federal judiciary, acting through the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, transferred all filed asbestos cases not yet on
111
trial to one district. Subsequent to this transfer and consolidation,
112
the parties managed to enter into settlement negotiations.
The Amchem settlement covered two broad types of asbestos
plaintiffs: those seeking redress of current injury or disease and
103

James E. Alleman & Brooke T. Mossman, Asbestos Revisited, SCI. AM., July 1997,

at 70.
104

Id. at 70.
Uses included being woven by the Ancient Greeks into handkerchiefs and
being placed in schools, office buildings, and ships in the industrial era to guard
against fires. Id. A popular French legend tells of Emperor Charlemagne lighting an
asbestos tablecloth on fire to intimidate dinner guests. Id. at 71. And during World
War II, the Central Intelligence Agency investigated rumors that the Germans were
thwarting a global asbestos shortage through their development of a chemical
substitute. Id. at 72.
106
Id. at 72–73.
107
BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 41 (5th ed. 2005).
108
Id. at 102. See also id. at 97 (noting that “the average time from onset of
exposure to development of cancer was 25 years for lung cancer with asbestosis, and
30 years for peritoneal cancer”).
109
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997).
110
Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS
LITIG. 2–3 (1991)).
111
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599.
112
Id.
105
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those—so-called “exposure-only” plaintiffs—seeking the equivalent of
113
The settlement provided,
insurance against possible future harm.
inter alia, for varying payouts for currently injured class members, and
guaranteed recovery for exposure-only plaintiffs if and when they
114
developed symptoms of an asbestos-related disease. Eventually, the
115
district court approved both class certification and the settlement.
The Third Circuit, however, in the consolidated case of Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., reversed on a number of grounds, including
116
lack of adequate class representation.
In the Amchem cases, the named class representatives included
both currently injured class members and exposure-only class
117
118
members.
No separately represented subclasses were created.
This engendered a situation where currently injured class
representatives were acting on behalf of absent, exposure-only class
members and exposure-only class representatives were acting on
119
behalf of absent, currently injured class members.
The Court held these two groups to be in inherent conflict,
120
neither of which could adequately represent the other. Those class
members seeking redress of current injuries or disease would chase
121
the highest possible current payouts.
In contrast, exposure-only
plaintiffs—having not yet suffered cognizable injury—would seek
122
minimal immediate recovery for the class. This group would lobby
for inflation protection and provisions that account for the possibility
that future and more sensitive medical testing could reveal as-yet
123
undiscovered harmful effects of asbestos exposure.
As a result of
these powerful conflicts of interest, the Third Circuit reversed the
124
approval of the settlement, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
In Dewey II, the Third Circuit returned to Amchem, grounding
Footnote 19’s proposition in a quote from the Supreme Court: “The
113

Id. at 602–04.
Id.
115
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
116
83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
117
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 625–26.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–26.
124
Id. at 629.
114
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disparity between the currently injured and exposure-only categories
of plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category are not made
insignificant by the District Court’s finding that petitioners’ assets
125
suffice to pay claims under the settlement.”
In other words, the
structural adequacy (the combination of currently injured and
exposure-only plaintiffs into one class) did not, ostensibly, result in
financial prejudice (as the defendant parties would always be able to
afford payments to all harmed class members). Reversal was
126
Indeed, in Footnote 19, the Third Circuit
nevertheless required.
used this exact sentence to assert that “[t]he fact that the stars
aligned and the class members’ interests were not actually damaged
does not permit representative plaintiffs to bypass structural
127
requirements.” It is with that proposition that this Comment takes
issue.
B. Escaping Amchem
Reversing approval of class action settlements for representative
inadequacy that did not cause harm wastes both judicial and party
resources. As mentioned in the Introduction, federal dockets are
already strained, especially in light of ever-increasing diversity class
128
action litigation.
Where the ordinarily invaluable structural requirements of Rule
23(a) are not met, but the “stars align” and class members are not
129
monetarily prejudiced as a result, appellate courts should let these

125

Id. at 626, quoted in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. The assessment that the
asbestos defendants would be able to meet any obligations was based on reports
submitted to the district court by financial experts. Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). The
reports examined the financial viability of the various defendant entities, using an
initial ten-year period as a benchmark. Id. The reports asserted that, for eleven of
the defendants, there was only a 2% chance of default under the weight of all claims.
Id. For another eleven defendants, the chance of default was 5%. Id. And, finally,
for the remaining two defendants, the chance of default was 25%. Id.
126
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 190.
127
Id. at 189 n.19.
128
See supra text accompanying notes 1–7.
129
In the context of civil litigation, the general result of prejudice against a party
is monetary loss. Nonetheless, certainly, in the event a structurally inadequate class
action settlement unfairly prejudices a party in some non-monetary, but tangible, way,
the same analysis should apply and the settlement should still be overturned.
Similarly, while the focus of this Comment is the so-called “adequacy requirement,”
the broader argument—that harmless procedural failings should not automatically
require appellate reversal of a class action settlement—could also be applied to other
Rule 23 requirements, however unlikely they are to be the subject of such a reversal.
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settlements stand, rather than upset the finality of carefully
considered and judicially approved agreements. Below, Part VI of
this Comment suggests the evidentiary “harmless error doctrine” as a
potential legal framework for class action settlement appellate review.
Still, even assuming acceptance of this framework, it is necessary
for courts to sidestep the proposition espoused in Footnote 19 of
Dewey II. As such, this Comment argues that the Third Circuit
misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem. Moving
beyond the solitary passage quoted in Footnote 19, a broader
examination of the holding in Amchem reveals a more complicated
picture of the settlement at issue there—a picture that exposes
fundamental differences between it and the settlement in Dewey II.
This being the case, other appellate courts should decline to follow
the approach of the Third Circuit. And the Third Circuit itself—
perhaps even the Supreme Court—should step in to reverse course of
this precedent.
Part V(B)(i) examines the Third Circuit’s misinterpretation,
Part V(B)(ii) uses another section of Dewey II to further undermine
Footnote 19, and Part V(B)(iii) adds an additional policy argument
to the reasons why the footnote’s rule should be abandoned.
1. Dewey II Incorrectly Interpreted Amchem
Again, recall that the Third Circuit cited to the following
statement in Amchem to undergird its own holding: “The disparity
between the currently injured and exposure-only categories of
plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category, are not made
insignificant by the District Court’s finding that petitioners’ assets
130
suffice to pay claims under the settlement.” Unlike in Footnote 19,
however, the Supreme Court continued:
The terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation
decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit
defendants’ liability. For example, as earlier described, the
settlement includes no adjustment for inflation; only a few
claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and loss-ofconsortium
claims
are
extinguished
with
no
130

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626, quoted in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. The presence
of two potentially misaligned groups of class members in both cases certainly makes
comparisons between the two tempting, if not inevitable. See Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he settlement does more than simply provide a general recovery fund. Rather,
it makes important judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different
kinds of plaintiffs, decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over others.”).
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131

compensation.
Thus, unlike what can be gleaned from Footnote 19, the Supreme
Court did not rest its decision only on the grounds of some
theoretical structural deficiency.
Present in that settlement
agreement was a structural deficiency that manifested in financial
harm to one group over another.
By way of example, “the [Amchem] settlement includes no
132
adjustment for inflation.”
Any future injuries that exposure-only
class members claimed would not be upwardly adjusted for the
133
This is a very tangible
always-decreasing value of money.
disadvantage. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, since
1997—the year Amchem was decided—the value of $1.00 has inflated
134
by as much as 44%. For plaintiffs needing treatment for cancer or
135
other diseases, this is quite a significant jump.
And added to the
other shortcomings mentioned by the Court, this settlement plainly
and financially favored the then injured plaintiffs at the expense of
136
the exposure-only group.
Indeed, the “undivided set of
representatives could not adequately protect the discrete interests of
137
both currently afflicted and exposure-only claimants.”
Contrast this with the statement made in Dewey II: “The fact that
the stars aligned and the class members’ interests were not actually
damaged does not permit representatives to bypass structural
138
requirements.”
This assertion is unqualified and, given the more

131

Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 627.
133
Id.
134
CPI
INFLATION
CALCULATOR,
http://www.bls.gov/data/
inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (illustrating the purchasing
power of $1.00 in 2012).
135
But see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 638 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An inflation
adjustment might not be as valuable as the majority assumes if most plaintiffs are old
and not worried about receiving compensation decades from now. There are, of
course, strong arguments as to its value. But that disagreement is one that this Court
is poorly situated to resolve.”).
136
Id. at 611.
137
Id. To a degree, even the Third Circuit acknowledges some of the inherent
differences between the settlement in Amchem and that in Dewey II. See Dewey v.
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (Dewey II), 681 F.3d 170, 185 (3d. Cir. 2012) (“This
case bears some resemblance to Amchem and raises some of the same concerns. . . .
This resulted in a misalignment of interests–certain members of the class had an
incentive to pursue protections for future claims, while the representative plaintiffs
lacked any such incentive. Here, on the other hand, the alignment of interests is not
so starkly problematic.”).
138
Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.
132

LEVY (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 12:21 PM

COMMENT

651

complex picture in Amchem, not a natural interpretation of the
139
Supreme Court’s holding.
Yes, in Amchem—like in Dewey—there was a structural
140
representative adequacy problem with the division of the class. And
yes, in Amchem—like in Dewey—this structural representative adequacy
problem did not seem to bear practically on the size of the settlement
141
negotiated; there was enough money to go around.
But in
Amchem—unlike in Dewey—the problem did produce a tangible
142
detriment to the inadequately represented faction.
“[T]he
settlement unfairly disadvantaged those without currently
compensable conditions in that it failed to adjust for inflation or to
143
account for changes, over time, in medical understanding.”
139

On this point, by way of devil’s advocacy, it is necessary to posit that a similar
substantive qualification could theoretically be asserted about the settlement at issue
in Dewey II as well. It is certainly possible that the Rule 23(a)(4) deficiency did
indeed cause the residual group tangible, financial harm. There was obviously a
conceptual scenario in which the $8 million fund was completely or partially
exhausted by the reimbursement group, leaving either nothing or reduced pro rata
recoveries for the residual group. See, e.g., supra note 63. Though high recovery
rates are not common, were not expected here, and indeed did not manifest, an
argument could be made that the terms of the settlement were facially unfair. The
Third Circuit raises this possibility in another footnote: “there remained a chance,
however remote, that the fund would not be sufficiently large.” Dewey II, 681 F.3d at
187 n.15. Indeed, the actual terms of the restructured settlement considered this
possibility and made some adjustments to the contours of the $8 million fund.
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (2012). The fund
remained capped at $8 million only to the degree that, were this amount not to be
exhausted by the end of the claims period, any differential would go to charity, as was
provided for in the original agreement. Id. See also supra note 63. What changed
from the first settlement to the new settlement, however, was that if this $8 million
fund was exhausted, Volkswagen would fully pay any timely claims in excess of the $8
million. Dewey III, 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (2012). Practically, the $8 million was
always expected to suffice, and appeared to be more than enough to pay all claims
even by the promulgation of Dewey III. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
Still, this modification technically created an unlimited claims fund. On its face, this
argument then makes the above assertion—that there is analytical space between
Amchem and Dewey II—a theoretical straw man. The text of Footnote 19, however,
renders this hypothetical irrelevant. The Third Circuit was unabashed in its
proposition that “the stars aligned and the class members’ interests were not actually
damaged.” Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189, n.19. The thrust of this Comment can
therefore easily rest solely on that language, notwithstanding any real or imagined
factual assertions to the contrary.
140
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626, quoted in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.
141
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 606. Additionally, the Amchem settlement’s other limitations on recovery,
see supra text accompanying note 131, such as the extinguishment of loss-ofconsortium claims can also be conceptualized as financial symptoms of inadequate
class representation. Individuals with unique interests are best cared for by unique
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In Amchem, the Rule 23(a)(4) deficiency was not merely
structural; it was actual. Therefore, Footnote 19’s use of Amchem to
undergird its automatic-reversal-for-structure proposition was
misplaced. This doctrine should therefore be ignored or overturned.
2. The Language of Dewey II is Inherently Contradictory
Certainly, “the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental
144
importance to the rule of law.” For the sake of a predictable legal
145
system, courts must follow precedent.
Yet, although “[t]he
obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity . . . a contrary
146
necessity marks its outer limit.” The Supreme Court has not been
shy about the malleability of precedent:
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our
own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. At
the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself
felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so
clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason
147
doomed.
It is to the “other extreme” that this Comment appeals.
Adding to the case for the rejection of Footnote 19, the Third
Circuit itself—in Dewey II—wavered from its stance. “Obviously,” the
Third Circuit qualified, “not all intra-class conflicts will defeat the
148
adequacy requirement.”
And, when discussing the general law of
Rule 23(a)(4), the Third Circuit emphasized that only “fundamental”
149
representative inadequacies will defeat the class. The court directly
cited the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals to
help define this term: “A fundamental conflict exists where some
[class] members claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that
150
In fact, this type of
benefited other members of the class.”

representatives.
144
Welch v. Tex. Dep’t. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987).
145
See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Paul Gewitz & Michael Ansaldi, The Case Law System
in America, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 989, 991 (1988).
146
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
147
Id. at 854.
148
Dewey II, 681 F.3d 170, 184 (3d. Cir. 2012).
149
Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189
(11th Cir. 2003) (“Significantly, the existence of minor conflicts alone will not defeat
a party’s claim to class certification: the conflict must be a ‘fundamental’ one going
to the specific issues in controversy.”)).
150
350 F.3d at 1189, cited in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 184 (emphasis added).
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qualification is not uncommon in the relevant case law.
Footnote 19 lost sight of this clear tempering of the adequacy
requirement, tempering that the Third Circuit itself embraced. At
best, this undermines Footnote 19. At worst, it renders the judgment
in Dewey II inherently paradoxical. Either way, it further justifies
152
jettisoning Footnote 19 and the proposition for which it stands.
3. Professional Class Action Settlement Objectors
In addition to the general policy of not unnecessarily
overburdening federal courts, one specific, recent trend in class
action litigation begs for fewer—not more—procedural hurdles to
the finalization of class action settlements. Though reversals of class
153
action settlements may still be relatively rare, the role of objectors
in settlement proceedings is increasingly significant and
151

See, e.g., Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“For a conflict of interest to defeat the adequacy requirement, that conflict must be
fundamental.”) (emphasis added); Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959
(9th Cir. 2009) (“An absence of material conflicts of interest between the named
plaintiffs and their counsel with other class members is central to adequacy and, in
turn, to due process for absent members of the class.”) (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added)). Due process
concerns, as noted in Rodriguez and Hanlon are certainly well taken. The heart of
Rule 23 is protection of absent class members’ interests. See supra Part III. Yet, such
protection is not the only policy at issue in the class action settlement approval
process. Justice delayed, as the maxim goes, is justice denied. And vague notions of
due process should not require unnecessary delay for non-existent financial gain.
152
As an aside, an argument—though admittedly a weak one—could be made for
Footnote 19 being relegated to dicta. The fact that this assertion is housed in a
footnote, however, is not necessarily an indication of the dividing line between
precedent and non-binding dicta. Even if Footnote 19 was the only source in Dewey II
for the current issue, for even the first-year law student, Footnote 4 of United States v.
Carolene Products Co. serves as a lasting monument to the potential centrality of
footnotes in legal analysis. 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). See also Louis Lusky, Footnote
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982). And—far
from the ultimate result in Dewey II not being dependent on the subject of Footnote
19—a judgment demanding reversal of this settlement, even where no additional
monetary relief would be afforded, was central to Dewey II. 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. It
may be somewhat easier to assign the relevant statements in Amchem to dicta, as that
reversal turned on a number of issues. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 628 (1997) (“[W]e have concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy the
requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation.”)
(emphasis added). Still, a case turning on multiple dispositive issues also does not
render each tangential to the judgment. And, clearly, adequacy of representation
was fundamental to the reversal in Amchem. Either way, the gravamen of Dewey II is
likely too intertwined with Footnote 19 for it to be considered dicta.
153
See generally THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 80– 86 (1996).
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154

controversial.
Rule 23(e)(5) permits “[a]ny class member [to]
155
object to the [settlement] if it requires court approval.”
Certainly, objectors serve an important conceptual purpose in
156
making the class representatives accountable to the class as a whole.
But objectors are also infamously unpopular participants in the
157
settlement process.
They can cause delay for the sake of delay,
essentially extorting class representatives and their counsel into
158
Soreceiving payoffs to avoid further disruption of the process.
called “professional objectors” have been labeled “the least popular
159
litigation participants in the history of civil procedure.” In fact, one
commentator noted, “objectors are as welcome in the courtroom as is
the guest at a wedding ceremony who responds affirmatively to the
minister’s question, ‘Is there anyone here who opposes this
160
marriage?’”
Considering the existence and growing proliferation of
professional objectors, courts should be especially wary of placing any
more procedural impediments in the path of class action settlements.
Footnote 19 is one such impediment. Its effect is to render viable
objections that put money in the pockets of objectors’ attorneys
alone. Giving objectors the power and encouragement to object
when they are the only parties who will benefit financially, only fuels
161
the cottage industry of objecting for its own sake.
154

See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors:
What to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865 (2012); Edward Brunet, Class Action
Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403
(2003).
155
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
156
Brunet, supra note 154, at 408–09 (“Informational input from objectors
regarding a proposed settlement could, in theory, improve the monitoring problem.
By definition, the objector is a monitor, who is evaluating a proposed settlement and
then investing resources to either improve the settlement or reject the settlement.”).
See also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563
(D.N.J. 2003) (objectors contributed to an increase of approximately $56 million in
recovery for class members).
157
Lopatka & Smith, supra note 154, at 867.
158
Id.
159
Brunet, supra note 154, at 411.
160
Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 REG. 4 (1997).
161
It is worth mentioning that Ted Frank, founder and president of the Center
for Class Action Fairness, was the lead attorney behind the objection at issue in Dewey
II. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Volkswagen Group of Am, Inc.
(Dewey II), 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-3618(L), 10-3651(XAP), 103652(XAP), 10-3798), 2011 WL 4975416 (“Mr. Frank [is] the appointed champion of
the West objectors.”). The Center for Class Action Fairness has, in the past, been
negatively labeled a professional objector, though Mr. Frank disputes the label. See,
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VI. HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
As already noted, in place of Footnote 19’s reversal-forstructural-deficiency rule, courts should instead apply an already
ubiquitous framework for appellate review: the harmless error
doctrine. Though this principle largely governs evidentiary, trial, and
criminal law, it can easily be applied to the current context.
In the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, “[a] party may
claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error
162
affects a substantial right of the party.”
In the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, harmless error is defined as “[a]ny error, defect,
163
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights.” All
fifty states have similar provisions, which are generally interpreted to
mean that reversals for evidentiary error are only appropriate if the
164
error can be shown to have harmed the appealing party.
And the
Uniform Probate Code is pushing for this doctrine to be applied to
165
improperly executed wills as well.
Furthermore, the harmless error doctrine is so ingrained in
American jurisprudence that even constitutional trial errors need not
166
automatically result in appellate reversal.
True, “there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
167
never be treated as harmless error.” And those errors that demand
automatic, unqualified, reversal include a denial of a criminal
168
defendant’s right to counsel,
exclusion of members of a
169
defendant’s race from grand jury proceedings, and a right to public
170
trial.
But aside from these exceptions, and a small number of
e.g., Daniel Fisher, A Lawyer Who Tries to Block Settlements, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2009, 6:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/outfront-tort-consumers-lawyer
-tries-to-block-settlements.html (“Frank is ‘a professional objector,’ fumes Stephen
Garcia, lead attorney on a suit against Motorola . . . [But w]hen pushed, Garcia can’t
name a case where Frank earned a fee; Frank says all of his objections so far have cost
him money.”). Instead, Frank styles himself, and his organization, as a bulwark
against class action settlements that unfairly benefit attorneys at the expense of class
members. See, e.g., Rachel M. Zahorsky, Unsettling Advocate, 96 A.B.A. J. 30. See also
CENTER
FOR
CLASS
ACTION
FAIRNESS,
http://centerforclassactionfairness.blogspot.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
162
FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
163
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
164
See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
165
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-503 (amended 2010).
166
Id. at 22–23.
167
Id. at 23.
168
See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
169
See generally Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
170
See generally Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
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172

others, “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”
This dividing line—between errors that can be overlooked as
harmless and those so fundamental that they require automatic
reversal—was succinctly described by Professor Charles Ogletree, Jr.,
in his article Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error
173
to Coerced Confessions. “To the Fulminante majority,” wrote Ogletree,
referencing a landmark Supreme Court case for harmless error
analysis,
a trial error seems to be one for which we can sometimes
know for sure whether it has caused inaccuracy in a trial
outcome, and a structural error seems to be one for which
we can never know with any certainty. This artificial
174
distinction, however, is really one of degree, not of kind.
Said differently, an error only requires automatic reversal if the
appellate court cannot at all discern if the outcome of the underlying
trial would have been different but for the error.
Thus, Footnote 19 begs the following question: did the error
(the division of the class members into the two groups) actually affect
the outcome (the ultimate financial recovery)?
This Comment has already demonstrated that the answer is no.
Nothing substantial would have changed had the error not occurred.
Nothing substantial did change. The settlement in Dewey I should not
have been disturbed. And subsequent judicially approved settlements
in analogous circumstances should not be disturbed either.
VII. CONCLUSION
175

The Third Circuit spoke of line drawing.
It chastised the
district court for certifying a class and approving a settlement that
176
violated Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement of adequate representation.
It claimed that those drawing the line were not poised to do so with
177
the interests of the whole class in mind. But if the Third Circuit’s
171

See generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1177 n.36 (1995).
172
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991).
173
105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991).
174
Id. at 162.
175
Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (Dewey II), 681 F.3d 170, 177–78 (3d.
Cir. 2012) (“It was this line-drawing exercise that exacerbated the adequacy problem
here . . . That is, every plaintiff had an incentive to draw the dividing line just
beneath their model run, placing as many cars as possible into the residual group.”).
176
Id.
177
Id.
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own words are to be believed, this was truly a line drawn in the sand.
No class members were likely to be prejudiced by the settlement as
178
was written, and none were.
In Amchem, the Court correctly upheld the rejection of the
settlement agreement at issue because it treated one class of plaintiffs
179
unfairly. Because of the inadequate representation of counsel, the
group of victims with exposure-only claims was set to receive a lesser
180
The fact that the defendants possessed enough money to
award.
181
pay both classes of plaintiff was inapposite.
In Dewey II, the Third Circuit took an offhand remark in the
Amchem decision out of context. In failing to recognize that Dewey was
distinguishable, the Third Circuit misread the Court and incorrectly
expanded the scope of Amchem. And the resulting doctrine,
expressed in Footnote 19, adds pressure to overtaxed federal courts
and emboldens professional objectors. Dewey II’s automatic-reversalfor-structural-problem rule is incorrect, bad policy, and should be
overruled.
The stars aligned. Isn’t that enough?

178

One final anticipated counterargument, similar in nature to what is discussed
supra, in note 139, is that the original settlement did not sufficiently notify the
residual claimants of their rights. That is, the original notice to class members
described the differences between the reimbursement and residual groups, and the
updated settlement required notifying the former-residual claimants that they could
now seek recovery from the $8 million fund in the first instance. Dewey v.
Volkswagen of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 379 (2012). This is an advantage, however,
that relates to time and nature of recovery, not monetary size of recovery. And even
were this benefit quantifiable—which, itself, requires some logical leaps—Footnote
19 does away with any damaging effect such benefits might have on the thrust of this
Comment. As far as the Third Circuit was concerned, “class members’ interests were
not actually damaged.” Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. It was on this assumption that
the reversal rested.
179
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–27 (1997).
180
Id.
181
Id.

